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Melanie Stallings Williams* and Dennis A. Halcoussis** 
Unions and Democracy: When Do Nonmembers 
Have Voting Rights? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Unions were created – and their operations covered by federal and state law – for 
the purpose of protecting workers.1  Yet union activities have long been the subject 
of observations that they operate in decidedly undemocratic ways.  Unions, for ex-
ample, are not normally required to let their members participate in negotiations or 
to ratify contracts.2  And those represented by (but are not members of) unions 
have even fewer rights.3  In many states and under federal law, employees can be 
compelled to contribute to the cost of union representation even while not joining 
the union.4  Known as “agency fee payers,” the rationale is that those who choose 
not to join a union should be required to pay for the services received, i.e. union 
representation in bargaining and other employment negotiations.5  While federal 
and state law exists to protect these agency fee payers from discrimination, there is 
little (and, what there is of it, inconsistent) enforcement of legislative guarantees 
that the union will treat such employees with fairness and impartiality.  But with 
few democratic processes in place to protect union members, there are fewer still to 
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 1. See, e.g., Erin Murdock, The Result of Disparate Treatment of Third-Country Alien Employees in Multi-
national Enterprises: A Class Distinction, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 325, 336 (2008). 
 2. Alan Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793, 805 (1984). 
 3. See Note, The Agency Shop, Federal Law, and the Right-to-Work States, 71 YALE L.J. 330, 338–39 (1961). 
 4. See Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt & Winston Lin, The Great Recession, the Resulting Budget Shortfalls, 
the 2010 Elections and the Attack on Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the United States, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & 
EMP. L.J. 407, 428–30 (2012). 
 5. See Martin H. Malin, The Evolving Law of Agency Shop in the Public Sector, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 855 (1989). 
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protect agency fee payers, who have no right to vote on union officials, contract rat-
ification, or strike authorization.6 
The article explores the somewhat inconsistent judicial treatment of the question 
of whether agency fee payers are entitled to vote on matters related to the terms and 
conditions of employment. The article then examines a recent California decision 
holding that a union did not unlawfully discriminate against agency fee payers by 
refusing to let them vote on a proposed furlough unless they joined the union.  It 
then explores the topic of “elite” union bargaining that forecloses democratic pro-
cesses. 
II.  RIGHTS OF FAIR REPRESENTATION FOR AGENCY FEE EMPLOYEES 
A. AGENCY FEE PAYERS 
In twenty-four states, union membership for covered employees is purely volun-
tary.7  Such “right to work” states legislate (by constitutional amendments, statutes 
or both) that workers cannot be compelled to join unions.8  In the remaining twen-
ty-six states and in some employment governed by federal labor law, however, em-
ployees were traditionally required to join a union as part of a “closed shop.”9  Such 
workers could be compelled, as a condition of employment, to join a union.10  Em-
ployees paid union dues that covered not only the cost of employment representa-
 
 6. Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 501, 503 (2000). 
 7. See Marisa Benson & Tiffany Nichols, Labor Organizations and Labor Relations: Amend Article 2 of 
Chapter 6 of Title 34 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to Membership in Labor Organizations, so 
as to Provide for Definitions; Provide for a Statement of Rights Under Federal Law; Provide for Certain Contract 
and Agreement Employment Rights; Provide for Policy Concerning Passage of Laws, Ordinances, or Contracts that 
Waive or Restrict Federal Labor Laws; Provide for Changes to Agreements and Contracts Permitting Labor Organi-
zations to Deduct Fees from Employees’ Earnings; Provide for Related Matters; Provide for Severability; Repeal Con-
flicting Laws; And for Other Purposes, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 191, 193 (2013). 
 8. ALA. CODE § 11-43-143 (1967), §§ 25-7-1, -2, -3, -6 (1943), 25-7-9 (1886), 25-7-12, -13, -16 (1943), 25-
7-30 to -35 (1953); ARIZ. CONST. art. XXV (1982); ARK. CONST. amend. 34 (1944); FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 6 
(1968); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6-6, -7, -20 to -28 (1947); IDAHO CODE §§ 44-2001 to -2010 (1985), -2011 (1995), 
-2012 to -2013 (2011); IND. CODE § 1.IC 22-6-6 (2012); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 20.8, 20.10 (1974) and 731.1 to .8 
(1977); KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 12; LA. REV. STAT. Ann. §§ 23:881 to :889 (1956); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 
423.1, .2, .8, .14, .17, .22 (2012); MISS. CONST. art. 7 § 198-A (1960); NEB. CONST. art. XV, §§ 13-15 (1946); NEV. 
REV. STAT. §§ 613.130 (1967), -.230, -.250 to -.300 (1952), 288.140 (1969); N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 95-78 to -84 
(1947), -98, -100 (1959); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-16-07 (2001); §§ 34.01-14 (1948), -01-14.1 (1987), -08-02 
(1935), -09-01 (1947), -11.1-01, -11.1-03, -11.1-05, -11.1-08 (1985), -12-02, -12-03 (1961); OKLA. CONST. art. 
XXIII (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-7-10 to -90 (1954); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1946); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 
50-1-201 to -204 (1947), §§ 49-5-602, -603, -609 (2011); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 101.003, .004, .052, .053, .102, 
.111, .121 to .124 (1993); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-34-1 to -17 (1955); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-58 (1970), -58.1 
(1973), -59 to -68 (1970), -69 (1973); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-7-108 to -115 (1963). 
 9. Rex H. Reed, Revolution Ahead: Communications Workers v. Beck, 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 635, 635 
n.5 (1990); see also Clyde W. Summers, Freedom of Association and Compulsory Unionism in Sweden and the 
United States, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 669 (1964) (discussing “closed shop” agreements as examples of “union 
security” clauses). 
 10. Summers, supra note 9, at 669. 
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tion but also the cost of the union’s political activities— activities with which the 
employee may or may not have agreed.11  The result was particularly problematic for 
public sector employees.  If public employees were required to pay, indirectly, for 
campaign contributions and political initiatives as a condition of employment, how 
could corruption be avoided? 
The issue was decided in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ. when the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that while the government had a legitimate interest in requiring gov-
ernment workers to be represented by a union, but held that agency fee payers 
could not be compelled to contribute to any union activities not related to em-
ployment representation.12  The court noted that “contributing to an organization 
for the purpose of spreading a political message is protected by the First Amend-
ment” and that “a government may not require an individual to relinquish rights 
guaranteed him by the First Amendment as a condition of public employment (ci-
tations omitted).”13  When public employees were compelled to make political con-
tributions through a union, the court held, their constitutional rights had been in-
fringed, for “at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual 
should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s beliefs should be 
shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State (citations 
omitted).”14 
Thus, the Abood court observed, nonunion employees have a constitutional right 
to “prevent the Union’s spending a part of their required service fees to contribute 
to political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its duties as exclu-
sive bargaining representative.”15  Further, the court noted that this conclusion was 
based on the U.S. Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of association as well as free-
dom of expression.16  “These principles prohibit a State from compelling any indi-
vidual to affirm his belief in God, or to associate with a political party, as a condi-
tion of retaining public employment. They are no less applicable to the case at bar, 
and they thus prohibit the appellees from requiring any of the appellants to con-
tribute to the support of an ideological cause he may oppose as a condition of hold-
ing a job as a public school teacher.”17  Therefore, under Abood, a union may charge 
agency fee payers only for those costs associated with employment representation.  
Subsequently, the court later held in Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1  v. Hud-
son, that unions must segregate costs associated with employment representation 
 
 11. See Reed, supra note 9, at 635–36 (1990) (discussing the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Communications Workers v. Beck on “coerced, ideological, and other non-bargaining spending” by unions). 
 12. 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 234–35. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 233. 
 17. Id. at 235. 
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from funds used for other union activities including political advocacy and must 
notify nonmembers of the ability to “opt out” of union membership.18 
Critics have noted that while agency fees were designed to prevent “free riders,” 
this rested on the assumption that employees had a unified goal that was being fur-
thered by union representation.19  The more a union engages in political activities 
and subsidies, of course, the less likely that is to be true.  Putting that conundrum 
aside, the next problem was to ensure that agency fee payers were represented fairly 
and impartially while, at the same time, honoring a union’s right to have its mem-
bers govern the organization free from unwarranted governmental interference. 
What followed were various federal and state regulations to require some em-
ployees to pay “agency fees,” i.e. those costs associated with employment represen-
tation with the requirement that unions treat such employees fairly and without 
discrimination.  These may be summarized as follows: 
Private sector employees: Most private sector employees are covered by the pro-
visions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  In Communication Workers v. 
Beck20 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that such employees could not be compelled to 
join unions but could be required to pay agency fees.21  The Hudson holding (i.e. 
that unions must notify employees of their right not to join the union and to assess 
only agency fees) was extended to private sector employees in Abrams v. Communi-
cations Workers.22  Private sector employees in right-to-work states may (depending 
on the legislation) be permitted to refuse to join a union or to pay any fees.23 
Federal employees: Most federal employees, including postal workers but ex-
cluding airline and railroad employees, need not join a union or pay agency fees.24  
Federal employees may be excluded from self-representation but receive all em-
ployment-based benefits of union representation.25 
Airline and railway employees: Employment relations for such workers are cov-
ered by the Railway Labor Act (RLA).26  Following the Abood approach, the U.S. Su-
 
 18. 475 U.S. 292, 305–06, 310 (1986). 
 19. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representation, 94 VA. L. REV. 1, 39 
(2008). 
 20. 487 U.S. 735 (1988). 
 21. Id. at 745. 
 22. 59 F.3d 1373, 1375, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 23. See James C. Thomas, Right-to-Work: Settled Law or Unfinished Journey, 8 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L 163, 163 
(2007). 
 24. 5 U.S.C. § 7102 (2012) (federal employees generally); 39 U.S.C. § 1209(c) (2006) (postal employees).  
 25. See David Silverstein & Erin Siuda, Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit: Labor Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 896, 906–07 (2005) (noting that unions may become the 
“sole bargaining representative” for a unit of federal employees and that “managers of federal employees have a 
reciprocal duty to engage in good-faith collective bargaining with those unions on any condition of employment” 
(emphasis added)). 
 26. See William E. Thoms & Frank J. Dooley, Collective Bargaining Under the Railway Labor Act, 20 
TRANSP. L.J. 275, 275 (1992). 
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preme Court ruled that these workers cannot be compelled to join a union but may 
be required to pay agency fees.27 
B. RIGHTS OF FAIR REPRESENTATION 
Whether agency fee payers had a right to be fairly treated by their unions was decid-
ed in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.28  In Steele, African American em-
ployees were exclusively represented by a union but were denied the ability to join 
the union, based on their race.29 The union then enacted rules that “disqualified” all 
African American employees and prevented African Americans from being hired by 
the railroad.30  The Alabama Supreme Court permitted the discriminatory conduct, 
holding that once a majority of represented employees had chosen their union, the 
union had no duty to protect the rights of minorities and the state had no right to 
interfere with union operations.31  Reversing the state court decision, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that unions must represent “all of its members, regardless of their 
union affiliations or want of them.”32  It concluded that unions owe a duty to repre-
sent its workers “fairly, impartially, and in good faith” regardless of whether they 
were union members.33 
Whether the right of fair representation requires unions to permit represented 
non-members to vote on matters relating to employment, however, has gotten in-
consistent treatment in the courts.  There are few such cases; the paucity of litiga-
tion probably a result of the heavy burden on employees to show a breach of duty of 
fair representation34 and partly due to the high costs and low benefits to individuals 
in challenging unions, discussed more fully  below.35 
Some courts have held that there is no duty to permit agency fee payers to vote 
on negotiated employment matters. In Penn. Labor Relation Bd. v. Eastern Lancaster 
Co. Educ. Ass’n, for example, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that a 
union that allowed its members but not nonunion employees to vote on a proposed 
contract ratification did not constitute a denial of the union’s duty of fair represen-
tation.36  The court held that the ratification of employment contracts was an inter-
 
 27. Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 447–48 (1984). 
 28. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).   
 29. Id. at 194–95. 
 30. Id. at 195–97. 
 31. Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 16 So. 2d 416, 420 (Ala. 1944), rev’d 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
 32. 323 U.S. at 200.  
 33. Id. at 204.   
 34. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 73–74 (1975) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the evolution of the law regarding the duty of fair representation has placed a heavy 
burden on employees). 
 35. See infra Part II.E. 
 36. 427 A.2d 305, 307–09 (Pa. Commw. Ct.1981). 
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nal union matter that should be free from “judicial interference.”37  Despite the fact 
that the proposed contract ratification would affect all employees regardless of 
whether they were union members, the court placed the burden on nonunion em-
ployees to show that the union’s representation was not performed in good faith.38  
The court justified judicial non-interference, at least in part, on the state’s compel-
ling interest in the “orderly resolution of labor disputes.”39 
Similarly, in Afro-American Police League v. Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago 
Lodge,40 a federal court held that represented non-union members had no right to 
vote to ratify a negotiated employment contract, even when the petitioners claimed 
that the proposed contract was racially discriminatory.  The court found that the 
duty of fair representation “is not violated by the mere failure of the union to allow 
the nonmembers to vote on the contract.”41  With a similar approach, another fed-
eral court held in Standard Fittings Co. v. NLRB that when an employer tried to ne-
gotiate with represented non-union member employees who had been excluded 
from voting on a proposed contract revision, it committed an unfair labor prac-
tice.42  Even if the union had violated its duty of fair representation to non-
members, the court held, such a duty was owed only to the employees, and the em-
ployer could not use the union’s conduct as a justification to bargain directly with 
employees.43  Thus, a union could exclude agency fee payers from voting on their 
employment contracts and an employer’s efforts to appeal directly to those employ-
ees was wrongful. 
Other courts, by contrast, have concluded that nonmembers do have a right to 
vote on employment matters.  In Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, Local No. 310 v. NLRB two unions, the Teamsters 
and the AFL-CIO, were joint representatives of a company’s employees.44  The AFL-
CIO accepted a collective-bargaining agreement before the Teamsters had an op-
portunity to ratify it.45 The court found that the AFL-CIO violated its duty of fair 
representation to the Teamster workers when it effectively denied them an oppor-
tunity to vote.46  Unlike the positions taken elsewhere, the court rejected the argu-
ment that voting on contract ratification was an internal union matter.  “As a gen-
eral proposition,” the court acknowledged, “it is true that a union only breaches its 
duty of fair representation when it discriminates against employees ‘in matters af-
 
 37. Id. at 308. 
 38. Id. at 309. 
 39. Id. at 310. 
 40. 553 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Ill. 1982) The case was decided not under labor law but instead as a Title VII 
claim.  See id. at 668. 
 41. Id. at 668. 
 42. 845 F.2d 1311, 1319 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 43. Id. at 1317–18. 
 44. 587 F.2d 1176, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 45. Id. at 1179. 
 46. Id. at 1184. 
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fecting their employment.’ . . .  Notwithstanding the correctness of its premise, 
however, the Board’s argument that depriving the Teamsters of the opportunity to 
vote on a contract that would govern them for the next three years had ‘no effect on 
the terms and conditions of [their] employment’ is preposterous.”47 
Similarly, another federal court found that it was an unfair labor practice to deny 
a vote to nonunion members in a bargaining unit.  In Branch 6000, Nat’l Ass’n of 
Letter Carriers v. NLRB, a union had held a referendum to determine how to allot 
days off from work and pledged to be bound by the voting results.48  Agency fee 
payers were not permitted to vote.  In affirming the decision of the NLRB, the court 
held that since the vote affected the terms of employment and since the union, by 
agreeing to be bound by the vote of the union employees, had delegated its deci-
sion-making power to union membership, they must allow represented nonmem-
bers to vote.49  The court fell short of finding that contract ratification would require 
a vote of all affected employees if the union had retained their negotiation function 
and had some mechanism for considering the positions of nonunion employees.  
But allowing the matter to be decided by a vote that excluded nonmembers, the 
court held, was a breach of the union’s duty of fair representation.50  Additionally, 
the court acknowledged the NLRB’s finding that the union breached its duty of fair 
representation when it used the vote as an opportunity to lobby nonmember em-
ployees to join the union.51  The union “improperly encouraged non-union em-
ployees to join the union so as to have their interests fairly represented,”52 the court 
held, since, as members of the bargaining unit, they already had a right to have their 
views considered.  In dicta, the court noted that ratification of a contract would not 
necessarily require inclusion of nonmembers in a vote, as long as the union had 
some mechanism for considering the views of nonmembers.53 
Relying on Branch 6000, the NLRB held in Int’l Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron 
Shipbuilders, Blacksmith Forgers and Helpers, Local 202, that a union violated its du-
ty of fair representation when it excluded nonmembers from voting on when a 
“floating holiday” should be taken.54  The Board found that the voting was a substi-
tute for negotiation, thus eliminating the union representation function.  It consti-
tuted an unfair labor practice, therefore, to allow the matter to be determined by a 
vote reserved to union members alone.55 
 
 47. Id. at 1183. 
 48. 595 F.2d 808, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 49. Id. at 810–11. 
 50. Id. at 813. 
 51. Id. at 811 n.13. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 813. 
 54. 300 NLRB 28, 30–32 (1990). 
 55. Id. at 32. 
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C. WILLIAMS V. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In this context of mixed federal rulings on whether agency fee payers had a right to 
vote on matters relating to the terms and conditions of employment and with no 
rulings under applicable state law, the California Court of Appeals considered in 
Williams v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd.56 whether agency fee payers had a right 
to vote on matters related to the terms and conditions of employment.  The case 
arose in the context of California’s fiscal crisis of 2009. 
Petitioners Williams and Halcoussis were professors at California State Universi-
ty.57  They were agency fee payers to a union which acted as their exclusive repre-
sentative pursuant to California’s Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations 
Act.58 Similar to federal law, California law required that the union represent all unit 
employees “fairly and impartially”59 and that a “breach of this duty shall be deemed 
to have occurred” if their “conduct in representation is arbitrary, discriminatory, or 
in bad faith.”60  As part of its negotiation during the fiscal crisis, the union put to a 
vote whether to accept furloughs which would result in salary reductions of more 
than 9%.61  The union permitted only members to vote although the proposed fur-
loughs would affect all unit employees.62  Likewise, only members were permitted to 
participate in the union’s online poll.63  Williams and Halcoussis alleged that the 
union violated its duties of fair in nondiscriminatory representation.64  In addition 
to permitting only members to vote, the union used the threat of furloughs as an 
opportunity to encourage nonmembers to join the union so that they could vote,65 
similar to the union’s solicitation in Branch 6000. 
Unlike Branch 6000, however, the California Court of Appeals had no objection 
in the union taking the opportunity to encourage nonmembers to join the union so 
that they could vote.  This was, for the trial court, a simple issue of paying for a ser-
 
 56. 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 618, 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).  
 57. Id. at 619.  The authors were the petitioners. 
 58. CAL. GOV. CODE § 3560 (1983).  
 59. CAL. GOV. CODE § 3571.1(e) (1989). 
 60. CAL. GOV. CODE § 3578 (1979). 
 61. Joint Appendix at 234–36, Williams v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Bd., 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2012) (No. BS127710) [hereinafter J.A.]. 
 62. Id. at 236. 
 63. Id. at 132. 
 64. Id. at 236. 
 65. Id. at 132 n.1. One union solicitation read: “A vote of the CFA membership on whether to accept the 
Chancellor’s proposal for a two-day-a-month furlough (equivalent to a 9.5 percent reduction in pay during the 
2009/10 academic year). . . .  As in contract ratification votes that also determine salary and other terms of em-
ployment, all active CFA members will be eligible to vote in this election. . . . In addition to voting on the fur-
lough proposal, faculty members will also be given the opportunity to participate in an exit survey immediately 
following the vote to capture the broader spectrum of faculty opinion on this issue. . . . You must be a member 
to vote. Sign up to become a member[:] Non-CFA-members who would like to join in time to vote on the fur-
lough issue are invited to do so at any time now through Thursday, July 16, 2009 at 5 pm.”  
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vice, treated not much differently than a poll tax.66  “In exchange for paying less,” 
the trial court noted, “they do not get to vote.”67 The Court of Appeal acknowledged 
that while there was conflicting evidence, it was not clear that the union had aban-
doned its representative function in leaving the issue of furloughs to a vote.68  
Therefore, the court reasoned, the petitioners had not demonstrated that that the 
union had violated its duty of fair representation.69 
It is difficult to draw conclusions on an agency fee payer’s right to vote on mat-
ters relating to employment from such a slim history of inconsistent decisions.  Of-
ten, courts have found that if a union retained any negotiating capacity, then it need 
not permit nonmembers to vote.  If a matter relating to the terms and conditions of 
employment is left solely to a vote, however, some courts have found it to be a vio-
lation of a union’s duty of fair representation to refuse to allow nonmembers to 
vote.  Local No. 310, which found that refusing non-members an opportunity to 
vote, can be distinguished because it did not involve agency fee payers but instead 
members of a competing union.70  The other cases that have held that the union 
committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to permit agency fee payers an op-
portunity to vote, i.e. Branch 600071 and Int’l Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Local 
202,72 are ostensibly distinguished by whether the union had relinquished its negoti-
ation function but, oddly, they also involve the less important issues.  Both Branch 
6000 and International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Local 202 raised questions of 
how to determine employee days off.73  While courts have often ruled against agency 
fee payers’ rights to vote on the basis that the decision is not significant enough to 
justify judicial interference in what are characterized as internal union matters, it is 
odd that in cases where more significant employment decisions were at issue (e.g. 
the contract ratifications in Eastern Lancaster Co. and Afro-American Police League 
and furloughs in Williams) courts have declined to “interfere.”  These odd distinc-
tions and somewhat inconsistent decisions are partly the result of a paucity of cases; 
there have simply been so few cases it is difficult to identify common judicial 
themes or approaches.  The inconsistencies, however, illustrate a general judicial 
aversion to challenge the conduct of unions, even when the equivalent discrimina-




 66. Williams v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Bd., 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 618, 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 
 67. J.A., supra note 61, at 241 n.7.  
 68. Williams, 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 625–26. 
 69. Id. at 626. 
 70. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local No. 310 v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 71. Branch 6000, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 72. Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Local 202, 300 NLRB 28 (1990). 
 73. Branch 6000, 595 F.2d at 810; Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 300 NLRB at 29. 
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D. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS OF UNION MEMBERSHIP TO FACULTY 
Aside from the issue of whether excluding nonmembers from voting constitutes an 
unfair labor practice, why wouldn’t an employee want to join a union?  Presumably 
there are financial advantages that outweigh the cost of membership.  Taking the 
university employment of the employees in Williams as an example, however, there 
is little or no demonstration that union representation increases employee compen-
sation.  In one study, researchers used data for U.S. faculty from 1970-76 to calcu-
late simple ratios and t-tests and found no gains in income from unionization.74  
Another study used individual level faculty data for the U.S. from 1977 to estimate 
three regression models.  The results show less than a 2% premium for faculty who 
were unionized.75 
A subsequent study by Randall Kesselring advanced the sophistication of the re-
search by treating the union versus non-union choice as endogenous.76  By using a 
series of maximum likelihood probit regressions and data from U.S. Ph.D.-granting 
institutions for the early 80s, Kesselring found that unions actually decreased faculty 
compensation at the margin.77  Ashraf found an average premium for unionization 
of 4.4% but discovers the premium varies widely, from -7.63% to 13.07, depending 
on the characteristics of the faculty member.78 
Two studies not only show the return from unionization to be low, but also sug-
gest that the one can get inconsistent higher results for the premium by focusing on 
a cross-section technique rather than using panel data.79  A likely explanation for 
this phenomenon is that a cross-section model would not capture the effect of un-
ionization on a faculty member’s salary across the course of his career.  One of the 
studies found a 5-6% premium for unionization for the U.S. by using a cross-
section model, but when using panel data and a fixed effects model, the unions have 
a negative effect on faculty salary.80  The remaining study found a union premium 
of 2-3% for Canada, using a fixed effects panel data model.81  Monks found a 7-14% 
union premium by using a cross-section model estimated with U.S. data from 1992-
93.82  Monks noted that this is substantially higher than what is found in the rest of 
 
 74. William W. Brown & Courtenay C. Stone, Academic Unions in Higher Education: Impacts on Faculty 
Salary, Compensation and Promotions, 15 ECON. INQUIRY, 385, 385 (1977). 
 75. Debra A. Barbezat, The Effect of Collective Bargaining on Salaries in Higher Education, 42 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV., 443, 453 (1989). 
 76. Randall G. Kesselring, The Economic Effects of Faculty Unions, 7 J. LAB. RES. 61, 61 (1991). 
 77. Id. at 69–70. 
 78. Javed Ashraf, Do Unions Affect Faculty Salaries?, 11 ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 219, 219 (1992). 
 79. See Daniel I. Rees, The Effect of Unionization on Faculty Salaries and Compensation: Estimates from the 
1980s, 14 J. LAB. RES. 399, 416 (1993); Daniel I. Rees, Pradeep Kumar & Dorothy W. Fisher, The Salary Effect of 
Faculty Unionism in Canada, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV 441, 443 (1995). 
 80. Rees, supra note 79, at 416. 
 81. Rees, Kumar & Fisher, supra note 79, at 446. 
 82. James Monks, Unionization and Faculty Salaries: New Evidence from the 1990s, 21 J. LAB. RES. 305, 305 
(2000). 
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the literature.83  Note that the cross-section model used in Rees and Monks would 
not adequately capture the dynamic effect of salary compression which has in-
creased over time. 
Martinello provided a detailed investigation of salary compression, inversion ef-
fects, and their interaction with unionization.84  Martinello found that for universi-
ties in Ontario, after controlling for a series of faculty characteristics, the salary dif-
ferential between associate and full professors decreased 50% from 1970 to 1990.85  
By 2005 there was salary inversion, so that younger faculty were earning more than 
those 5-15 years older.86  In addition, Martinello’s sample exhibited classic salary 
compression with those in their early 30s making approximately the same average 
salary as those in their early 40s.87 
Consistent with previous results, Hosios and Siow used data from 1973-1995 and 
OLS estimation to find only a small positive earnings effect from unionization at 
Canadian Universities.88  More recently, Hedrick et al. used instrumental variables 
estimation to correct for measurement error in estimating union strength.89  Utiliz-
ing panel data set from 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004 for two- and four-year U.S. 
schools, Hedrick et al. found a union premium that varied from -0.1% to 1.8%.90  
Henson et al. used the same data set as Hedrick et al. (2011) but focused only on 
two-year schools.91  Using a random effects model, Henson et al. found a union 
premium of 2.8-3.0% for two-year schools in the United States.92 
Summarizing these studies, the only papers that found a substantial union pre-
mium were papers that utilized cross-section rather than panel data.  At least in this 
case, there is no reason to prefer a technique which utilizes less rather than more 
information (panel data include data over time as well as for different faculty; cross-
section data represent different faculty but are for only one point in time).  When 
panel data are used, there is a consensus in the literature that the premium earned 
by unionized faculty is small, somewhere from 3% down to a negative value.  Note 
that this result does not account for the cost of dues, calling into question whether 
faculty experience any gains in income from belonging to a union. 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Felice Martinello, Faculty Salaries in Ontario: Compression, Inversion, and the Effects of Alternative 
Forms of Representation, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 128 (2009). 
 85. Id. at 143. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Arthur J. Hosios & Aloysius Siow, Unions Without Rents: The Curious Economics of Faculty Unions, 37 
CANADIAN J. ECON. 28, 50 (2004). 
 89. David W. Hedrick, Steven E. Henson, John M. Krieg & Charles S. Wassell, Jr., Is There Really a Faculty 
Union Salary Premium?, 64 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 558, 572 (2011). 
 90. Id. at 573. 
 91. Steven E. Henson, John M. Krieg, Charles S. Wassell, Jr. & David W. Hedrick, Collective Bargaining and 
Community College Faculty: What Is the Wage Impact?, 33 J. LAB. RES.104, 106 (2012). 
 92. Id. at 114. 
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E. UNDEMOCRATIC LABOR 
Even if there were economic gains from union membership justifying the imposi-
tion of its costs on all represented employees, there is little to justify the undemo-
cratic nature of unionism.  In his seminal 1984 study, Alan Hyde surveyed the laws 
governing democratic processes in union activities and found that “elitist bargain-
ing” had become the model of American labor.93  Hyde found that until the late 
1970s, “no reported cases protected democracy in collective bargaining” and that 
few subsequent developments had ensured democratic protections.94  The duty of 
fair representation (at issue in Williams) “does not seem to require any particular 
bargaining procedures”95 but instead “imposes on unions only a modest and ill-
defined obligation to consider employees’ interests.”96  Hyde finds that “judicial 
queasiness”97 to mandate democratic processes – instead preferring a model of elit-
ism -  to be rooted in three outdated social science notions.98  First, it rests on an as-
sumption of political scientists in the 1950s that elitism in labor relations “was both 
desirable and inevitable” in industrialized nations.99  Second, a reliance on a 1950s 
political science model that assumes that union bargainers are responsive to their 
represented workers and that the representatives have considered all viewpoints in 
proportion with their overall representation in the group100 and finally an assump-
tion that since unions are representative and, in fact, more reasonable and concilia-
tory than those they represented given the delay and disorder that occur from dem-
ocratic collective bargaining, elitism is preferable.101  Hyde observes generally that 
judicial tolerance that allows the most minimal showings of “fair representation” is 
based on models that assume that true democracy is inefficient and “reveal the shal-
lowness of the national commitment to union democracy.”102  He surmises that “ju-
dicial reluctance to require the same levels of democracy in collective bargaining as 
in other union actions stems only partly from a sense that democracy is unim-
portant, though surely its full importance is not appreciated, and only partly from a 
sense that democracy is infeasible.103 Courts prefer elitism mainly because they think 
that democratic collective bargaining would be cumbersome, inefficient, inflation-
ary, and destructive of fair representation.”104 
 
 93. Hyde, supra note 2, at 831. 
 94. Id. at 796. 
 95. Id. at 806. 
 96. Id. at 819. 
 97. Id. at 796. 
 98. Id. at 831–33. 
 99. Id. at 831. 
 100. Id. at 832. 
 101. Id. at 832–33. 
 102. Id. at 856. 
 103. Id. at 848. 
 104. Id. 
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Extending Hyde’s work, Professors Michael C. Harper and Ira C. Lupu called for 
a revision of the standard of “fair representation” to mean equal protection.105  Cit-
ing Steele v. Louisville106 to note that a union bears “at least as exacting a duty to pro-
tect equally the interests of the members of the [unit] as the Constitution imposes 
upon the legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those for whom it 
legislates,”107 Harper and Lupu observed that subsequent decisions did not impose a 
standard of equal protection, but instead the “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad 
faith” standard in ways that were “haphazard” and “willy-nilly.”108  Instead, they 
posited, there should be a model of principled democracy – one that requires repre-
sentatives to act in concordance with a notion of fairness equally to those it repre-
sents.109 
Legal and social science research developed to show that the consequence of un-
democratic union representation was to marginalize racial minorities,110 women,111 
and the young112 and to sanction union corruption.113  For many unions, a history of 
exclusiveness results in income redistribution that benefits the predominantly white 
and male membership.114  Union corruption explains part, but not all, of employees’ 
disengagement in union activities.115  In a 1977 case, the U.S. Supreme Court con-
cluded that most meetings were attended by no more than 3.5% of members.116  Not 
surprisingly, unions are controlled by small groups of insiders.117  Monitoring costs 
are high and even if undertaken, there are significant limits to any change that could 
result.  Unions are not generally required to provide full accountings of its financial 
 
 105. Michael C. Harper & Ira C. Lupu, Fair Representation as Equal Protection, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1216 
(1985). 
 106. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
 107. Id. at 1213. 
 108. Id. at 1214. 
 109. Id. at 1216. 
 110. Harry G. Hutchison, Employee Free Choice or Employee Forged Choice? Race in the Mirror of Exclusion-
ary Hierarchy, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 369, 405 (2010). 
 111. Michael Wallace, Andrew S. Fullerton & Mustafa E. Gurbuz, Union Organizing Effort and Success in the 
U.S., 1948-2004, 27 RES. SOC. STRATIFICATION & MOBILITY 13, 30 (2009). 
 112. Union membership in 2012 was highest among workers aged 55 to 64 (at 14.9 percent) and lowest for 
those in the 16 to 24 age group (4.2 percent). Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Un-
ion Members–2013 (Jan. 24, 2013), available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/print.pl/news.release/union2.nr0. 
htm.  
 113. Christopher K. Coombs & Richard Cebula, The Impact of Union Corruption on Union Membership, 50 
INDUS. REL. 131, 132 (2011). 
 114. MORGAN O. REYNOLDS, MAKING AMERICA POORER: THE COST OF LABOR LAW 29 (1987). 
 115. Brian Petruska, Choosing Competition: A Proposal to Modify Article XX of the AFL-CIO Constitution, 21 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 8 (2003) (observing, for example, that union meetings tend to be monopolized by a 
small group of insiders, exacerbating the problem of union members’ disengagement). 
 116. Local 3489, United Steelworkers of Am. v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 307 (1977) (“At the time of the chal-
lenged election, there were approximately 660 members in good standing of Local 3489.  The Court of Appeals 
found that 96.5% of these members were ineligible to hold office, because of failure to satisfy the meeting-
attendance rule.”). 
 117. Petruska, supra note 115, at 8. 
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activities,118 there are few mandates requiring voting,119 and courts, as seen, are re-
luctant to protect worker rights or impose remedies.  Taken together, it is hardly 
surprising that unions are unrepresentative oligarchies. 
One solution is to mandate union democracy.  Among other benefits, democrat-
ic unions are generally more effective at their “core collective bargaining func-
tions.”120  Additionally, democratically-run unions show lower rates of corruption, 
labor racketeering and organized crime.121 “[C]orruption and oligarchy within un-
ions are closely related,”122 noted Seymour Martin Lipset many decades ago. 
Others see little value in pursuing a goal of union democracy, finding it both in-
effective and counterproductive.123  Estriecher observes that unions are run as one-
party states,124 and only insider activists have power.  Most union members do not 
find it worthwhile to monitor union performance and have little power to change 
matters even if they did.  Instead, Estreicher proposes, if all employees (including 
agency fee payers) had a right to vote a secret ballot on the key matters affecting 
them economically,125 it would narrow the agency cost problems and keep the 
agents (regardless of whether they were democratically elected) in check.  Under 
Estreicher’s proposal, “participational rights in critical economic decisions directly 
affecting the welfare of bargaining unit employees would be divorced from mem-
bership in the labor organizations.”126  “While there are many arguments against 
dual unionism,” Lipset noted in 1961, “it remains true that the existence of two un-
ions with similar jurisdictions serves to make each of them more responsive to 
 
 118. See, e.g., Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 310 (1986) (requiring only an 
“adequate explanation” of fees charged to nonmembers). 
 119. Hyde, supra note 2, at 793. 
 120. Michael J. Goldberg, The Employment and Labor Law Professor as Public Intellectual: Sharing Our Work 
with the World: In the Cause of Union Democracy, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 759, 763 (2008). 
 121. Id. at 764; see also Seymour Martin Lipset, The Law and Trade Union Democracy, 47 VA. L.R. 1, 6 
(1961) (“[T]here can be little doubt that corruption, racketeering, and other practices detrimental to the public 
interest are much more likely to flourish in dictatorial unions than in those subject to membership control.”). 
But see Petruska, supra note 115, at 22 (noting that union democracy has not only failed to stop corruption but, 
because of the judicial tendency to adopt a “hands-off” view, “union democracy has had the effect of fortifying 
the dominion of union oligarchies”). 
 122. Lipset, supra note 121, at 13. 
 123. Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 501, 502 (2000). 
 124. Id. at 502–03 (citing SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, UNION DEMOCRACY: THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHIC UNION (1956)). 
 125. Estreicher, supra note 123, at 503–04 (“These ‘critical voting opportunities’ should include a statutory 
right of all represented employees (whether or not they are union members) to vote in secret ballot on: (1) au-
thorization of the exclusive bargaining representative; (2) reauthorization at periodic intervals of the bargaining 
agency; (3) the employer’s final contract offer; (4) strike authorization; (5) contract ratification; and (6) the 
level of fees to be assessed for the bargaining agency (i.e., union dues).  If these critical election opportunities are 
provided, we should have a substantial narrowing of agency cost problems, (i.e., greater fidelity of union agents 
to the employee principal) and at the same time open the way for alternative forms of bargaining agents poten-
tially to emerge.”).  
 126. Id. at 517. 
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membership wishes.”127  Competition, then, would be the solution to the problem of 
unrepresentative and unresponsive union conduct. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
While there have been repeated calls for increased democracy in union activities 
since at least the 1970’s, few judicial decisions have mirrored the concern.  As long 
ago as the 1960’s, noted Lipset, there was “general agreement” that “the ordinary 
procedures of the law, which rely heavily on complaints to the courts or law-
enforcement agencies by individuals who have grievances, have not served to pro-
tect union member and other workers whose rights were denied.  The courts are 
unable to afford adequate relief in many cases because they either lack consistent 
and explicit standards and are not familiar with union practices, or because most 
union members are reluctant to use the courts or cannot bear the costs of litiga-
tion.”128  Instead, legislation that limits employees’ obligation to join unions or pay 
agency fees have increasingly made the point moot: in the roughly half of all states 
that have “right to work” statutes,129 union democracy is of little import.  The sec-
ond significant trend affecting union power is the sharp decline in the number of 
employees belonging to unions; almost half the representation of thirty years ago.130 
However, for those employees still bound by exclusive representation pacts, un-
ions still have broad powers to limit participation in decisions affecting their em-
ployment.  Protecting union autonomy is more important, in the view of many 
courts, than is protecting the employment participation rights of employees.  Under 
federal law and that of many states, at least, agency fee employees must either elect 
to join unions (and subsidize the unions’ political and campaign contributions) or 
be refused an opportunity to vote on employment matters.  Whether the solution is 
to mandate democracy, institute competition, or enforce equal protection rights, 
the current state of the law requires employees to choose between exercising their 
first amendment rights or their employment rights; they cannot have both. 
 
 127. Lipset, supra note 121, at 12. 
 128. Id. at 16–17. 
 129. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
 130. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members – 2013 (Jan. 24, 2014), 
available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/print.pl/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.  Union membership, i.e. the per-
centage of wage and salary workers who belong to a union, has declined to 11.8 percent in 2012, down from 
20.1 percent in 1983, the first year for which such data is available; in 2012, public-sector employees had union-
ization rates of 35.9 percent - more than five times higher than in the private sector, at 6.6 percent; within the 
public sector, local government employees had the highest unionization rate at 41.7 percent; men were more 
likely to be union members than were women (12.0 percent compared with 10.5 percent).; union membership 
was highest for workers in the education, training and library worker sector (35.4 percent) and protective ser-
vice groups (e.g. police, firefighters) at 34.8 percent.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, Union Members – 2012 (Jan 23, 2013), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_ 
01232013.pdf. 
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